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Abstract. While transparency in financial markets should enhance liquidity, its
exploitation by unethical and parasitic traders discourages others from fully em-
bracing disclosure of their own information. Traders exploit both the private infor-
mation in upstairs markets used to trade large orders outside traditional exchanges
and the public information present in exchanges’ quoted limit order books. Us-
ing homomorphic cryptographic protocols, market designers can create “partially
transparent” markets in which every matched trade is provably correct and only
beneficial information is revealed. In a cryptographic securities exchange, market
operators can hide information to prevent its exploitation, and still prove facts
about the hidden information such as bid/ask spread or market depth.
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1 Introduction
Market information plays a crucial role in modern securities exchanges. Published
trades inform the public about the value of a particular security. Bid and ask quota-
tions in limit books inform traders about other traders’ interest in a security and at what
prices orders are likely to be filled. Price change and trading volume information for
equities track the (mis)fortunes and public awareness of corporations and equities mar-
kets. In theory, this market information should all benefit traders by forcing traders who
have private information to disclose it via their trades. Unfortunately this information
can also facilitate parasitic and unethical trading practices, and nondisclosure can itself
lead to new exploits by market insiders who can then benefit their own accounts over
investors’ accounts. Balancing these forces is a significant challenge in market design,
and homomorphic encryption techniques offer an attractive solution to this problem.
The application of homomorphic cryptography in other commercial protocols has
been well studied in the academic literature (open and sealed-bid auctions [19, 14, 24],
electronic cash [10], etc.) Yet, surprisingly little has been written about the contributions
cryptography can make to securities markets, in particular the open call auction and
continuous double auction protocols that underly most modern securities exchanges.
Important prior work in this area includes Giovanni Di Crescenzo’s pioneering work
exploring privacy for stock markets [9], the secure double auction protocols Wang et
al. propose in [23], which employs homomorphic ElGamal encryption, and a “Secure
Protocol to Construct Electronic Trading” described by Matsuo and Morita in [16].
The work of Bogetoft et al. in [5], based on secure multiparty integer computation,
proposes an application to securities exchanges, although in their protocol, “all trade is
executed at the same market clearing price” and orders that do not clear are rejected.
In our case, we wish to support both market orders and the limit order book that is an
integral component of modern financial markets. Less directly but nonetheless related,
Szydlo [22] has proposed the application of homomorphic cryptographic commitments
to the disclosure of stock portfolio holdings. Although some related work considers the
privacy of trader identities, our work concerns only the revelation of quantitative infor-
mation about trades not the anonymity of the traders, which we view as an orthogonal
problem.
While the objective in most cryptographic work for auctions has been to hide infor-
mation (secrecy), our objective is to enable a market designer to combine an appropriate
level of partial transparency with provably correct behavior. We also do this in a setting
informed by real-world demands, specifically, an exchange with both limit and market
orders, and in which multi-party computation by all parties is infeasible.
Our design allows market designers to specify exactly what they wish to reveal,
and reveal only that information while proving it, and the market operation, are correct.
Immediate applications of our work can be seen in preventing unethical and parasitic
trading practices in the major exchanges as well as providing for a means for trading
large block orders without revealing information that can be exploited. Evidence for
the need for information hiding in markets can be seen by recent SEC investigations
and criminal convictions of unethical traders, and the development of new alternative
trading systems (ATS’s) that privately match large block trades. We detail how market
information is misused and the securities industry’s responses in Section 2.1.
In situating our work, we first discuss the role of information in securities markets
from the perspective of market microstructure, a rich area of financial research that
studies the role and exchange of information in markets and how market design prin-
ciples serve to foster or inhibit information exchange. Market microstructure studies
questions such as: What are the costs and benefits of transparency in financial markets?
What determines the bid-ask spread for a particular stock? Do large orders really move
the market? What is the effect of (not) publishing insider trades?
For simplicity, we will consider a single, electronic clearing network in which spe-
cialists, broker/dealers, or retail traders may place limit or market orders for shares of a
particular equity (e.g. IBM stock) in a continuous double auction. We will explain the
roles of each of these parties in the market, the types of transactions they may partici-
pate in, and why they do.We consider the various forms of information that these parties
reveal through their actions (or inactions) and what information the markets reveal to
them, and how they can profit from that information.
After considering the role of participants and information in our market, we con-
struct a cryptographic framework that enables this information to be finely controlled
and disseminated according to the specific rules established by a market operator. We
observe that presently these types of information control are not achievable in financial
markets because of a lack of trust: it is this transparency that proves correctness of the
market transactions. Yet requiring full transparency to achieve correctness is a blunt
method that can be exploited. We decouple these considerations.
Our proposed system proves correctness and provides for any level of transparency;
being able to prove facts without directly revealing the numbers behind them offers
market designers a more expressive set of possibilities for reporting market status. Our
construction and protocols use homomorphic cryptography [18, 8, 19, 23, 22] to prove
the correct operation of the market according to its published rules and also to credibly
reveal the required market information to the participants.
It is not our intention to advocate particular kinds of transparency but rather to offer
a finer level of control to market designers. Indeed, this application of cryptography
seems to us to open up interesting new questions for the field of finance. We conclude
with worked examples and report the result of an initial analysis of the cost to support
a realistic order flow on current hardware.
2 Introduction to Financial Markets
In this section we provide an overview of how equities are traded in order to motivate
our contributions to those without a background in finance. The study of market mi-
crostructure in finance is most applicable to our work; Larry Harris’ book Trading &
Exchanges [12] is a well respected textbook on the field; we also found three recent
survey papers of market microstructure [4, 15, 21] helpful in framing our contributions.
In many cases, we will simplify the complex workings of modern financial markets
in order to illustrate the core principles that are relevant to our work. We clearly indicate
these simplifying assumptions in our exposition. We use as our model a market for a
single equity for a single company and assume that all trades in that market take place
on an electronic clearing network (ECN) running a continuous double auction with an
open limit order book. We assume that the market operates at fixed daily opening and
closing times and trading does not take place anywhere else when the market is closed.
For simplicity, we do not consider short sales or buying to cover, which are equivalent
to selling and buying long positions for our purposes.
The market maintains an order book in which all outstanding limit orders are
recorded. Depending on the transparency rules of the market, all, some, or none of
the limit orders on the order book may be available to the public. Real-world exchanges
(NYSE, NASDAQ, Chicago Board of Trade) offer various degrees of transparency for
their order books.
For the purposes of the cryptographic properties of our exchange, there is no im-
portant difference between dealers, brokers, specialists, or investors. In our simplified
model, everyone may post limit orders and has access to the same information.1 There-
fore we only consider two classes of participants: the (market) operator, i.e. the ex-
change or its agent, and traders, in which we include specialists, broker/dealers, and
institutional and retail investors.
As we present our model, we introduce formal definitions that we use later in our
protocol construction. We model the market state as the current state of the limit order
book B and trade history H . The order book B is private, but the trade history H is
public. (H can be public because any values logged therein are maintained in encrypted
form.) The market operator also maintains a public, encrypted order book Bˆ that is
equivalent to B except that all bids and quantities are encrypted. Each order placed
receives a unique identifier i regardless of whether it is a bid or ask order which is
associated with the order and its components. Ask and bid orders, ai and bi respectively,
enter the market when placed and exit the market when withdrawn or executed. An order
is the tuple (pi, qi, ti, si ∈ {a, b}) representing the price, number of shares, the time
1 A simplified way to look at it is that dealers, brokers and specialists provide liquidity to the
market to support the trades investors want to make. Possibly the most important function of
liquidity providers’ use of limit orders is enabling investors to place market orders.
the order was placed on the market, and the side of the market: whether the order is an
ask (sell) or a bid (buy). When an order is taken off the order book, it is removed from
the state of the order books B and Bˆ and the history H is updated with the execution
or cancellation that resulted in its removal.
We will also refer to a function with access to a complete price ordering of the
orders on the market o(s ∈ {a, b}, rank) whose arguments are the side of the market
(ask or bid) and the order’s rank where the most competitive price on either side has
rank = 0. Its output is the unique identifier i for the ask or bid with the given rank . For
example, we might write the current bid/ask spread as po(a,0) − po(b,0), or the market
depth (measured in shares) of the most competitive ten bid orders as
∑9
r=0 qo(b,rank).
This ordering is maintained by the market operator; it is convenient for showing how
the market operator proves correct operation of the market. Obviously, the ordering
o(s, r) changes whenever an order enters or exits the market. This function is also used
to support the market invariant that all orders are maintained in strict priority order as
described in Section 3.
In modern equities markets, orders fall into two basic categories: market orders are
an instruction to buy or sell a specific quantity of a security, and are filled as soon as
possible at the best available price on the market; limit orders are an instruction to buy or
sell a specific quantity of a security at a specific price, and are filled only when another
participant in the market is willing to make the opposite trade.
More complex orders that use real-time market information are possible, depending
on broker support; for example, a stop loss order at a particular price instructs the broker
to sell a position at the market when the market reports a trade at or below that price.2
In practice, some traders also use orders based on real-time data as a substitute for limit
orders because of the information revealed by limit orders or to get a better price; for
example, an order such as “Buy 1,000 shares at the market if there are any trades below
$20.00” might be used instead of a limit order to “buy 1,000 shares at $19.99” in order
to keep the trader’s intentions secret and potentially get a better price if the stock price
dropped sharply. It might be that in a partially transparent market in which limit order
prices are hidden, traders would be more inclined to use limit orders in these cases.
2.1 Market Information and Its Misuse
In this section we explore how transparency can be exploited, then examine at a high
level the types of market information whose transparency may be regulated by crypto-
graphic systems.
Misuse of Market Information. The information provided by transparency can be ex-
ploited by unethical or creative traders. To illustrate this hidden cost of transparency, we
detail two common practices, one unethical and the other “parasitic”: front-running and
penny-jumping, respectively. Larry Harris’ chapter “Order Anticipators” in Trading &
Exchanges explores these and other related practices in depth [12]. We speculate that
2 Limit orders cannot substitute for stop orders. Limit orders are persistent, and less competitive
than the current equilibrium price; stop orders react to market movements and are at more
competitive prices. Our framework can be extended to support stop orders with concealed
prices; the operator would maintain a side list of stop orders and prove when their target prices
are reached by executed trades, all without revealing either the trade price or stop order price.
these exploitations of transparency may be part of the cause for the conflict between
published theoretical market microstructure results that show transparency should im-
prove liquidity and other empirical results that are ambiguous with respect to this ques-
tion [20].
“Front-running” is the unethical practice of a party with private information about
an incoming large order to the market running in front of that order to take a posi-
tion in the hope of making a quick profit when the large order arrives. For example,
a trader knowing that a mutual fund is going to buy a $10M position in IBM stock
might buy a smaller position beforehand with the expectation that the mutual fund’s
purchase will drive the price higher. Front-running and allegations of it are widespread.
In 2001, Dreyfus agreed to pay $20.5 million to settle accusations that their fund man-
ager Michael Schonberg engaged in front-running [1]. In 2003, the NYSE announced
its Enforcement Division had investigated several specialist firms for rule violations
including front-running and decided to bring disciplinary action against them. Seven
specialist firms agreed to pay over $200 million to settle charges brought as a result of
these allegations [2]. In July 2006 a Manhattan jury convicted former specialist firm
Van der Moolen managers Michael Stern and Michael Hayward of fraud for trading
stocks on the firm’s account before filling clients’ orders in order to boost Van der
Moolen’s profits and their own compensation [7]. In early 2007, The New York Times
reported other allegations of front-running: “The [SEC] has begun a broad examination
into whether Wall Street bank employees are leaking information about big trades to
favored clients. . . ” [3].
“Penny-jumping” is not illegal, but often described as “parasitic”. The practice ex-
tracts value from the market without contributing information. Specifically, a trader
identifies a large limit order on the order book (e.g. 10,000 shares at $25.00) and places
a smaller limit order one tick above that order (e.g. 1,000 shares at $25.01). The penny-
jumper’s order will be filled first, and he expects that his upside is greater than his
downside, because his downside is protected by a free trading option created by the
large limit order. If the market is random, it is likely that the stock will trade at a higher
price before the large order is filled. If the price happens to decline before it increases,
the large order will be filled, and the penny jumper exits his position via the large order
for a one-tick loss (e.g. after 8,000 of 10,000 shares have been filled).
One response to concerns of unethical and parasitic practices is to construct a market
in which only partial information is reported. But it is unclear whether investors would
trust that information’s correctness or trust the market operators not to benefit from any
private information. If prices are hidden, an unscrupulous market operator could simply
fill a favored party’s bid before higher bids. Indeed, regulators have begun to mandate
transparency to protect investors, in light of specialists and broker/dealers exploiting
private market information to their advantage [21, 15, 2, 1, 7].
There is also evidence that knowledge of large (“block”) trades is similarly ex-
ploited. According to Stoll [21], large blocks of stock are not sent to the open mar-
ket because “The risk of pre-trading portions of the block in this manner is that other
traders will become aware of the block and will sell in anticipation, perhaps driving
the price down. . . ” and because other traders can exploit knowledge of large orders
in other ways (as above). While Stoll further claims that “empirical evidence of block
trades is quite mild,” Keim and Madhavan [13] (as cited in [15]) find in an empirical
study that the average (one-way) price impact for a seller-initiated transaction is -10.2%
from a benchmark three weeks before a large block trade, after adjustment for market
movement.
Historically, block trades are performed in “upstairs markets” where brokers shop
around for the best deal. Keim and Madhavan “attribute this large price impact to infor-
mation ‘leakage’ arising from the process by which large blocks are ‘shopped’ in the
upstairs market.” [15] The reason for hiding information in block trades is mainly to
protect the traders before the large transaction occurs.3
In September 2006, a number of major banks announced a response to the block
trading problem with two new so-called ATS’s (Alternative Trading Systems). Citi-
group, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Bros., Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and UBS also
announced a “Block Interest Discovery Service” (BIDS) for automatically matching
large block orders without revealing them to the primary markets. Another ECN,
Liquidnet, specializes in institutional large block trades and has captured a small but
significant share of order flow: as of 30 June 2006 they handled over $175 billion (no-
tional) of trades with an average value of $1.42 million on US equities, according to
their website. This is clear evidence that institutional investors are dissatisfied with tra-
ditional market support for large block trades.
While these approaches help to limit the exploitation of information they do not
provide any correctness guarantees and moreover any published quotations can be ex-
ploited as before. These approaches also require that the block trades be separated from
the primary securities exchanges. This could have a significant impact on liquidity and
overall market efficiency. With our solution, quotations from the primary market can be
integrated into our order book and matched against standing block trades; all transac-
tions can be matched by a single efficient marketplace.
2.2 Developing a Cryptographic Securities Exchange
Our model is of a simple securities exchange in which a market operator keeps a private
order book B and publishes its public analog Bˆ with encrypted prices and quantities,
and (optionally encrypted) history of its actions H . Incoming limit orders are placed
on the book or matched with existing limit orders; incoming market orders are matched
with limit orders; the operator proves its actions correct.
Our primary goal is to prevent various adversaries from exploiting information
present in limit order books to the detriment of traders who wish to place limit orders.
These adversaries primarily include other traders and market insiders (market makers,
specialists, exchange employees) who attempt to (unethically or parasitically) profit by
exploiting limit order information.
Rindi [20] uses the term “partial transparency” in her examination of three regimes
of pre-trade transparency in a market for a risky asset based on an open limit-order book:
“under full transparency agents can observe the order flow and traders’ personal identi-
fiers; under partial transparency they can observe the order sizes and under anonymity
they can only observe the market price.”
3 Gemmill [11] offers an empirical analysis consistent with this view of the effects of post-trade
reporting of block trades on the London Stock Exchange. He finds ex post disclosure of block
trades does not have a dramatic effect on liquidity.
We consider each of these information classes in turn. For existing orders, the type
of the order is implied; if it is in the book, it is a limit order. Incoming orders may be
market or limit orders; we assume that is disclosed. In call auctions, the transaction type
(buy or sell) can be kept secret until the auction closes, but it is not meaningful to hide
whether an order is to buy or sell in continuous double auctions. As noted before, timed
expiration of orders is unimportant.
The price per share pi associated with an order ai or bi on the book may be fully
transparent (pi = $20.06), partially transparent ($20.00 ≤ pi ≤ $20.25), or kept com-
pletely private (pi =?). Similarly, the quantity qi and time posted ti may be fully, par-
tially, or not transparent.
The parameters of multiple orders may be related by inequalities. Two orders may
be related by price (e.g. pi ≥ pj), quantity (e.g. qi = qj) or time posted (e.g. ti < tj).
Partial or complete orderings for price and time of all orders in a limit book can be con-
structed using these methods, as will become important for more expressive partially
transparent revelations. Quantity becomes important when proving order flow and cor-
rect execution of trades.
Finally, one might wish to prove information about linear functions on the parame-
ters of multiple orders, or compute linear functions without revealing unnecessary ad-
ditional information about the orders themselves. Examples of these functions include:
– Bid/ask spread between the two most competitive orders
– Market depth within p cents of the mean between the outstanding bid and ask (mea-
sured in number of shares)
– Bid-ask spread between the two least competitive orders comprising a market depth
of q shares
– Prices (if any) at a market depth of q shares
– Average number of hours outstanding orders above price p have been on the market
Using recent advances in homomorphic encryption, market designers can construct
markets in which this kind of information can be revealed and proved correct without
revealing additional information about underlying orders.
Information, and related proofs, need not be issued in real-time, and in fact in many
cases market designers may prefer delayed revelation. In our system, market designers
can decide exactly when to reveal market activity, and even construct different disclo-
sure rules for different trade sizes. For example, the market might disclose small trades
within 30 seconds and large trades within 1 day.
3 The Cryptographic Securities Exchange
We have described the model of our market as a limit order book with a history. We
consider the state of the order book B, the encrypted public order book Bˆ, and the
history H to be the core state of our market. Various actions by the participants in the
markets update this state. We formally define these actions, who may perform them,
and how the update the state of the market depending on its state. The order book and
history begin as empty states.
In our present model we maintain an important invariant in B and Bˆ: all orders are
maintained in a strict priority ordering as defined by the ordering function o(s, rank).
Despite regulations that prescribe order routing priority, the priority of trades within ac-
tive markets is a complicated process beyond the scope of the present work. For exam-
ple, smaller orders at slightly less competitive prices or more recently submitted might
be filled instead of a large order that is the longest standing at the most competitive
price.
We model these priority rules as follows, from highest to lowest:
1) Most competitive price (pi is maximal)
2) Longest standing (ti is minimal)
3) Best “fill”, measured by the percentage of shares filled of the larger of the two
orders ( |qi−qj |max(qi,qj) is maximal).
We do not consider a formal mechanism for proving the time priority of an order
correct, in part because we see no benefit in encrypting the timestamp of an order:
orders are posted when they arrive, and that reveals the time they were posted. Further,
this information is not readily exploitable.
We assume a bulletin board that orders are posted to; the market operator is required
to accept new orders by adding them to the history H as soon as they arrive. We also
assume that at the beginning of each new trading session the public, encrypted order
book Bˆ has been verified by tracing through the previous day’s history in H .
3.1 Assumptions
Our protocol rests on certain realistic assumptions. The operator and all traders possess
the means for generating secure digital signatures. A universal, tamper-resistant clock
must be accessible by all parties, such as that maintained by the US NIST, to preserve
the integrity of timestamps. To prevent the operator from improperly failing to disclose
instructions, there is a universally accessible bulletin board—not maintained by the
operator—that records all activities of all parties and publishes them for anyone to see.4
(All private data remain secure by encryption.) We assume the hardness of the com-
posite residuosity problem supporting Paillier’s homomorphic encryption scheme [18].
We assume that a computer network may be monitored for activity, and that even large
amounts of activity can be examined for any information “leakage”.
3.2 Encryption Method
We employ the homomorphic encryption scheme described by Pascal Paillier [18] and
extensions published by Damga˚rd and Jurik [8], Parkes et al. [19], and a use of Boudot’s
efficient range proofs [6]. We write the encryption of a valuem with the market opera-
tor’s public key and random help value r as E(m, r). The properties of this cryptosys-
tem allow construction of mathematical proofs of certain facts over the ciphertexts. For
example, given only E(m1, r1) and E(m2, r2), one can prove a value is within a con-
stant range, e.g. m1 < n/2; inequalities, e.g. m1 > m2; or generate new ciphertexts
that are the sum of others, e.g. E(m1 + m2, r1 · r2) = E(m1, r1) · E(m2, r2). We
require these primitives for proving the correct operation of the market.
4 We assume a bulletin board strictly separate from the operator so that traders’ orders may be
presumed received and posted on time without respect to their content. Because the operator
can decrypt incoming orders, it is important that all incoming orders be posted by a neutral
third party to require the operator to prove its actions are correct; a corrupt operator could
delay or ignore incoming orders to benefit favored traders.
3.3 Processing Incoming Orders
Before orders arrive in any trading session, we recall that we assume the operator has
proven the public, encrypted order book Bˆ correct by reference to the orders posted
on the bulletin board in previous sessions. This means that all transactions may be
performed with respect to existing orders in the order book without need for further
proofs of their correctness or rank in the order book.
Limit Orders. Any trader in our model may place a limit order according to the fol-
lowing protocol. Each limit ask order ai is given a unique id i by the bulletin board and
enters the market in the following manner. Note that the same method applies for bid
orders bi by interchanging “ask” and “bid” and reversing inequalities (< becomes >).
Step 1. The trader encrypts the price p and quantity q and sends (E(p, rp), E(q, rq), a)
to the bulletin board. The bulletin board creates a unique identifier
i, adds a timestamp ti based on the current clock, publishes aˆi =
(E(pi, rpi), E(qi, rqi), ti, a), computes the digital signature SIGNBB (aˆi) and
both publishes it and sends it to the trader as a receipt. Only the operator can
see what the pi and qi are.
Step 2. The trader privately sends the random help values rpi , rqi to the operator.
5
Step 3. The operator privately decrypts the values in aˆi to compute ai = (pi, qi, ti, a),
and verifies that the random help values correspond to the ciphertexts provided.
Step 4. The operator logs in H that order ai was received at time ti.
Step 5. The operator compares pi to the best ask price, po(a,0) and the best bid price,
po(b,0) and proceeds in one of four ways:
– If the incoming ask order is priced at less than or equal to the highest pri-
ority bid, i.e. pi ≤ po(b,0), the operator matches ai with all outstanding bid
orders whose prices are ≥ pi up to the quantity qi in order of priority. If
there are not enough to fill ai, it becomes the most competitive ask order
on the order book afterward.
– If the incoming ask order is priced between the highest bid and the lowest
ask price, i.e. po(b,0) < pi < po(a,0), the operator adds it to the order book.
– If the incoming ask order is priced equal to the lowest ask price, i.e. pi =
po(a,0), the operator adds it to the order book.
– If the incoming ask order is priced higher than the lowest ask price, i.e.
pi > po(a,0), the operator adds it to the order book.
Step 6. The operator updates H on the bulletin board with the details of any trade that
resulted from receiving ai.
Step 7. The operator recomputes the ordering function o(s, rank) such that the rank of
all orders in B is defined and correct.
Step 8. The operator updates its private B and publishes Bˆ on the bulletin board with
the new set of encrypted orders.
5 This is required to prevent other traders from exploiting the malleability of the homomorphic
encryption scheme to submit bids based on a function of another trader’s bid, e.g. “his bid plus
10 cents.” Knowing the random help value implies knowing the decryption, so provided the
cryptosystem is secure and the random help values are secret, no trader can submit a correct
random help value for a ciphertext based on another trader’s encrypted values.
Step 9. The operator issues proofs of correctness of its actions on the bulletin board.
Specifically, it proves the necessary inequalities to pigeonhole the incoming
limit order ai in its proper priority ordering, maintaining the invariant that the
all outstanding orders in B and Bˆ are ordered according to priority.
Step 10. Anyone who wishes may verify the operator’s public proofs.
Market Orders. A trader in our model may also place a market ask order ai (or bid
bi). The protocol differs from the limit order protocol given above only in Step 5:
Step 6. The operator matches the incoming market ask order ai with the k highest
priority bid orders bo(b,0,...,k) such that the k − 1 highest bids do not fill ai but
k do, and executes the trade(s) on all matched orders.
Executing Trades on Matched Orders. The operator must prove that the quantity of
the k multiple limit orders a large order is matched with is greater than or equal to the
quantity of the market order, and that the sum of the quantities of the most competitive
k − 1 limit orders is strictly less than the quantity of the market order.
Two orders ai and bj are matched when the bid price meets or exceeds the ask
price, i.e. pj ≥ pi. If the quantities are equal, qi = qj , the trade is executed and both
orders are removed from the order books B and Bˆ and the transaction is logged in
the history H . Formally, to log the transaction the operator adds a journal entry to H
hi,j = (aˆi, bˆj , ti,j) with its signature SIGNMO(hi,j). The time ti,j is the time reported
by the universal clock at the time the order was executed. The operator also posts the
following proofs on the bulletin board:
– A proof that pj ≥ pi given E(pi, rpi) and E(pj , rpj ).
– A proof that qj = qi given E(qi, rqi) and E(qj , rqj ).
If the quantities differ, the order for fewer shares is fully filled and the order for
more shares is partially filled. Then, the smaller order (w.l.o.g. ai) is removed and the
larger order (w.l.o.g.) bj’s quantity is updated in the order books B and Bˆ. Formally,
the entry bj in B is replaced with bj = (pj , (qj − qi), tj , b), and in Bˆ with bˆj =
(E(pj , rpj ), E(qj , rqj )/E(qi, rqi), tj , b). Anyone can verify the correctness of the new
published bˆj by computing the quotient of the previously published encrypted values
E(qj , rqj ) and E(qi, rqi), which is known to be an encryption of their difference. The
transaction is logged in the history H as above with a similar journal entry hi,j =
(aˆi, bˆj , ti,j) and signature SIGNMO(hi,j). The operator also posts the following proofs
on the bulletin board:
– A proof that pj ≥ pi given E(pi, rpi) and E(pj , rpj ).
– A proof that qj > qi given E(qi, rqi) and E(qj , rqj ). This is done by showing that
(E(qj , rpj )/E(pi, rpi)) ·E(−1, 1) is the encryption of a value (qj−qi−1) < n/2.
(This proves that no wraparound occurred; we subtract 1 from qj − qi to prove a
strict inequality.)
One minor issue in a market without transparent prices is that a limit order may be
submitted to the market that is more competitive than it needs to be to clear. For exam-
ple, a trader might post a new limit order to sell at $20.05 when there is a standing order
to buy at $20.09. In transparent markets, this would obviously never happen except in
cases of error. Choosing the clearing price for such situations is a matter of market de-
sign. With the primitives we have described, it is possible to prove correct a clearing
price based on the standing order’s price, the incoming order’s price, the mean of the
two (within one tick), or indeed any linear function of the two prices, without revealing
the price itself or any information not implied.
Once two orders are matched and the proofs posted, a clearing agent will be respon-
sible for transferring the ownership of the shares at the correct settlement price. The
market operator will send the clearing agent the random help values necessary to verify
the correctness of the execution price and number of shares from the history posted on
the bulletin board. The agent then verifies the trade and settles it.
In addition to sending information to the clearing agent, any information published
about the state of the market is proven at this point on the bulletin board. For exam-
ple, the auctioneer might reveal the random help values associated with the determined
clearing price and matched quantity to provide “last trade” tick data, or update proofs of
market depth, bid/ask prices, etc. Typically the “market price” of a security for any pe-
riod is the price at which it was last traded during that period; thus, publishing provably
correct market prices is straightforward.
3.4 Post-Trade Reporting
The market operator can report clearing prices by revealing the random help values of
the encrypted orders in the history H after any specified delay. Immediate revelation
may be a problem in the event a partial fill is revealed and the remainder is still on the
market: is price is now public. Facts similar to those provable for limit orders may be
proven about trades after the fact, for example, volume, average price, closing price, etc.
Post-trade transparency is as easily controlled by market designers as transparency dur-
ing other phases of market activity, and we leave the question of appropriate reporting
rules open for this reason.
3.5 Adversaries and Attacks
The adversary we are most concerned about in this work is the unethical or parasitic
trader who exploits (presently public) market information for profit in a way that dis-
courages placement of limit orders. A secondary class of adversary is a dishonest market
operator who may attempt to profit by exploiting the now private market information
via trading or disclosure for compensation. We do not consider as adversaries parties
with private information external to the market’s operation, such as employees with
proprietary information about traded companies.
Traders We first consider attacks by parties who do not possess any insider access to
the market operator or its systems. These traders may either attempt to circumvent the
cryptographic security of the system or exploit the information provided in new ways.
Provided cryptographic keys of adequate security are chosen to prevent a brute-force
attack, cracking the encryption scheme itself is believed to be intractable under the
Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption described in Paillier’s work [18].
The semantic security of the probabilistic Paillier cryptosystem protects the en-
crypted values against chosen plaintext attack. (For example, using a deterministic en-
cryption of prices would be insecure, because an adversary could try all realistic prices
and identify the values.) Paillier’s scheme is not secure against an adaptive chosen ci-
phertext attack; indeed, the malleability of the scheme that enables the homomorphic
properties we employ implies this insecurity.However, mounting a successful chosen
ciphertext attack against our protocol does not seem a significant threat, as the only
way a value can be decrypted is in the event someone is willing to trade it. Thus, any
party attempting to gain information by submitting a chosen ciphertext as information
must also be willing to execute any trades from that information.
We have not identified any additional parasitic trading practices that could be em-
ployed using a cryptographic securities exchange. Since we are not adding any informa-
tion into the marketplace – only allowing designers to restrict information – we believe
that there are no new exploits that would not be possible in an ordinary market with an
open limit book.
This said, we reiterate that some parties may attempt to gain information from the
marketplace by placing orders. For example, one could discover the price for the most
competitive ask order by placing an order to buy one share at the market. Alternatively, a
trader might place limit orders at various prices to see where they fit into the order book,
in order to gain information about the price points, and then retract them. However,
no trader may observe anything about the market without fundamentally changing the
market: a “probe” share purchased revealed the price for that share only, and afterward,
the number of shares at that price remains unknown and becomes smaller; probe limit
orders enter the market and always bear the risk of being executed.
Several solutions to this problem come to mind. First, at a significant but tractable
complexity cost, the marketplace could maintain not a strict ordering over all orders, but
a partial ordering in which only the minimum information required to prove correctness
is revealed. Thus incoming orders that were not competitive (and likely to be filled)
would be proven only to be less competitive than the most competitive order. This
would significantly limit the ability of a trader to count trades above a particular price
by placing limit orders. Second, the market operator or market makers could place
random numbers of zero-quantity limit orders on the marketplace so that there would
be a large number of orders at every price point. Third, market designers could limit
such exploitative practices by limiting order frequency, sizes, or specifying a minimum
duration on the market.
The Market Operator A more insidious attack is if a dishonest market operator, pos-
sibly in collusion with another trader, exploits its valuable private information or gives
preference to particular traders. We recall our assumption of a bulletin board operated
by a third party to prevent the market operator from discarding dispreferred orders, or
delaying their publication until after preferred orders are listed. With this, an unscrupu-
lous market operator cannot issue valid proofs of correctness of matched trades, but he
could still selectively reveal information to preferred traders. We reiterate that despite
this implied trust in the market operator, our architecture provides for two improve-
ments over existing markets: information can be specifically controlled and is possessed
by only one party (instead of the entire market), and the market operator may not ma-
nipulate the market by front-running or matching orders on any basis other than the
published rules.
That said, the partial trust of the operator is a strong assumption, and solutions to
enhance that trust merit discussion. One answer is to distribute the trust in the market
operator among a group of parties, similar to the approach Bogetoft et al. describe [5].
This may be challenging from a business perspective but nonetheless possible. Another
solution involves careful network, hardware and software security, employing special
purpose hardware (e.g. that used in Trusted Computing architectures) that only runs
software approved and signed by a third party, and monitoring all network traffic to
detect any communications that might leak information.
4 Example Order Book and Transactions
This section describes incoming orders and how trades are identified and executed.
Table 1 shows a sample order bookB. The public, encrypted order book Bˆ is equivalent,
except that the quantities and prices are encrypted. R indicates rank . Orders are always
ranked in priority order. Each order’s rank is defined according to the priority rules
outlined above (best price, oldest) and randomly selected in the case of a tie.
We first consider an incoming market order to purchase 700 shares of the stock.
The trader constructs bˆ = ( , E(700), , b) and posts it on the bulletin board. The
bulletin board assigns ID i = 25 and timestamp ti = 09:44:32 and publishes
bˆi = ( , E(700), ti, M). For clarity, we will use i for the ID of each incoming order
in the following text to more clearly distinguish it from the limit orders.
The market operator sees the market order on the bulletin board, decrypts
bˆi to bi = ( , 700, ti, b), and matches two trades (a14, a12) to fill the or-
der. It adds journal entries to the history H and publishes proofs on the
R ID Time Qty Ask
3 11 09:34:42 2500 $20.13
2 13 09:39:23 500 $20.10
1 12 09:39:23 300 $20.10
0 14 09:41:06 600 $20.09
R ID Time Qty Bid
0 22 09:37:14 1000 $20.05
1 24 09:43:42 500 $20.02
2 23 09:41:23 800 $20.00
3 21 09:30:06 1700 $19.96
Table 1. Order Book B1
bulletin board:
– H ← hi = bˆi
– H ← h14,i = (aˆ14, bˆi, t14,i = 09:44:33)
– H ← h12,i = (aˆ12, bˆi, t12,i = 09:44:33)
– Proofs of correct quantities: q14 + q12 ≥ qi
and q14 < qi
– Sufficient proof of priority: q12 < q13
The operator then updatesB (and Bˆ) by removing
order a14 and updating q′12 = 300−(700−600) =
200 (and qˆ′12 = E(q12)/(E(qi)/E(q14))). Any-
one can verify that the updated encrypted quan-
tity qˆ′12 is correct by comparing it with functions
of the quantities of the other orders.
In a second example, a trader posts a new limit ask order aˆ =
(E($20.03, E(1200), , a) to which the bulletin board assigns i = 15, ti = 09:46:02.
The market operator sees it, decrypts it, and concludes it is more competitive than the
most competitive bid. He adds journal entries to H , removes bo(b,0), matches ai with
b22 and adds the remainder a′i to B and aˆ
′
i to Bˆ, preserving the priority order invariant,
and publishes:
– H ← hi = aˆi
– H ← hi,22 = (aˆi, bˆ22, ti,22 = 09:46:04)
– Proof of correct quantities: qi > q22
R ID Time Qty Ask
3 11 09:34:42 2500 $20.13
2 13 09:39:23 500 $20.10
1 12 09:39:23 200 $20.10
0 15 09:46:02 200 $20.03
R ID Time Qty Bid
0 24 09:43:42 500 $20.02
1 23 09:41:23 800 $20.01
2 26 09:50:33 200 $19.98
3 21 09:30:06 1700 $19.96
Table 2. Order Book B4
– Proof of price position: pi ≤ p22, pi > p24
– Proof of clearing price (as required)
In a final example, a trader posts a limit bid
order bˆ = (E($19.98, E(400), , b) to which the
bulletin board assigns i = 26, ti = 09:50:33. The
market operator sees it, decrypts it, and places it in
the order book in the appropriate position It adds
a journal entry toH , adds the order bi to B and bˆi
to Bˆ, preserving the priority order invariant, and
publishes H ← hi = bˆi and the proofs of priority
pi < p23 and pi > p21. The order book is now as
shown in Table 2.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
Clearly, providing controllable transparency of market information in securities ex-
changes together with proofs of correctness (both of information and of the market
operation) is an important application of homomorphic cryptography. The protocol pre-
sented here is simple to understand, closely related to existing financial market proto-
cols, and does not rely complex cryptographic primitives that might discourage its use
among traders. Finance research has already started to study the implications of dif-
ferent levels of partial transparency, seeking to ensure liquidity and limit exploitation.
Cryptography can be used to prove correct operation according to specified rules even
under partial transparency.
We envision a broad range of future work based on the protocol we have presented
and similar ideas. For instance, market designers might want support for more expres-
sive order types, such as fill-or-kill, immediate-or-cancel, order-cancels-order, or stop
orders maintained by the market. Our protocol could also easily be extended to open call
auctions or periodic clearing models (such as POSIT). The market operator might wish
to prove a less revealing ordering of the limit orders in the order book. Support for other
specialists and liquidity providers’ functions could be added by selective revelation.
Other more creative exchanges are possible in our setting. For example, integrat-
ing other ECN’s with a cryptographic securities exchange may be of particular use in
bridging the gap between block trades and ordinary securities trading. Cryptographic
derivative markets for options and indices whose prices are tied to the activity in under-
lying securities’ order books are another important possible extension of our work.
We have conducted an initial empirical analysis of the computation cost for running
such a system, and arrived at a conservatively high estimate of 5 cents (US) to place and
verify an order. Our experiments used a low end, dual Pentium IBM x-server with no
special cryptographic hardware. This is inexpensive enough to be feasible in practice,
although we leave a full efficiency analysis, perhaps in conjunction with a prototype, to
future work.
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